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Abstract
We examine the dynamic relation between return and volume of individual stocks. Using
a simple model in which investors trade to share risk or speculate on private informa-
tion, we show that returns generated by risk-sharing trades tend to reverse themselves
while returns generated by speculative trades tend to continue themselves. We test this
theoretical prediction by analyzing the relation between daily volume and rst-order re-
turn autocorrelation for individual stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX. We nd that
the cross-sectional variation in the relation between volume and return autocorrelation
is related to the extent of informed trading in a manner consistent with the theoretical
prediction.
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1 Introduction
Market participants carefully watch the volume of trade, which presumably conveys valu-
able information about future price movements. At the heart of the matter are the ques-
tions of why investors trade and how trades with dierent motives relate to prices. Two
reasons are often mentioned for why investors trade: to rebalance their portfolios for risk
sharing and to speculate on their private information. These two types of trades, which
we call hedging and speculative trades, respectively, result in dierent return dynamics.
For example, when a subset of investors sells a stock for hedging reasons, the stock's
price must decrease to attract other investors to buy. Since the expectation of future
stock payo remains the same, the decrease in the price causes a low return in the cur-
rent period and a high expected return for the next period. However, when a subset of
investors sells a stock for speculative reasons, its price decreases, reecting the negative
private information about its future payo. Since this information is usually only partially
impounded into the price, the low return in the current period will be followed by a low
return in the next period, when the negative private information is further reected in
the price. This example shows that hedging trades generate negatively autocorrelated
returns and speculative trades generate positively autocorrelated returns.
Intensive trading volume can help to identify the periods in which either allocational or
informational shocks occur, and thus can provide valuable information to market observers
about future price movements of the stock. In periods of high volume, stocks with a high
degree of speculative trading tend to exhibit positive return autocorrelation and stocks
with a low degree of speculative trading tend to exhibit negative return autocorrelation.
In this paper, we construct a simple equilibrium model to derive the return dynamics
generated when investors trade both to hedge and to speculate. The model illustrates
that the relation of current return, volume, and future returns depends on the relative
signicance of speculative trade versus hedging trade. If speculative trading in a stock is
relatively insignicant, returns accompanied by high volume tend to reverse themselves in
the subsequent period. If speculative trading in a stock is signicant, conditioned on high
volume, returns become less likely to reverse and can even continue in the subsequent
period. The dierence in the relative importance of speculative trading among dierent
stocks gives rise to the cross-sectional variation in their volume-return dynamics.
We empirically test the predictions of the model by analyzing the daily volume-return
dynamics of individual stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX. The basic structure of the
empirical tests is as follows. For each stock in the sample, we use a time-series regression
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to nd the relation between current return and volume and future return. Then, guided
by the predictions of the model, we examine how this relation varies across stocks with the
extent of speculative trading. We consider several proxies, such as market capitalization
and bid-ask spread, for the degree of speculative trading across stocks. Consistent with the
model, we nd signicant dierences in the dynamics of returns and volume across stocks
with dierent degrees of information asymmetry. Stocks of smaller rms, or stocks with
higher bid-ask spreads, show a tendency for return continuation following high volume
days. Stocks of larger rms, or stocks with smaller bid-ask spreads, show almost no
continuation and mostly return reversal following high-volume days.
We examine the robustness of our results along several dimensions. First, we explore
alternative econometric specications of our tests and nd that they do not change our
results. Second, we replace the daily interval with a measurement period that equates the
amount of noise trading across stocks, and show that it does not aect our ndings. Third,
we check the sensitivity of our ndings to the eect of the bid-ask bounce, which can also
cause return autocorrelation. We perform this check by repeating our main experiment
using returns calculated from mid-quotes rather than from the closing price of the day.
This alternative procedure does not alter our conclusions. Fourth, we show that our
ndings are not sensitive to alternative denitions of trading volume. Fifth, in light of
recent papers that identied a larger analyst following with a smaller adverse selection
problem, we use analyst following as an additional proxy for information asymmetry. Our
results show that stocks that are followed by more analysts exhibit less return continuation
following high volume days.
We also test the hypothesis that it is rm-specic private information that aects
the cross-sectional variation in the dynamic volume-return relation. We decompose both
the volume and return series into systematic and unsystematic components. We nd
that the relation between information asymmetry and the inuence of volume on the
autocorrelation of returns persists when we remove the market-wide variations from the
analysis.
Many recent papers investigate the relation between return dynamics and trading vol-
ume. Several of them focus on aggregate returns and volume (e.g., Campbell, Grossman,
and Wang, 1993 (henceforth CGW); Duee, 1992; Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen, 1992;
and LeBaron, 1992). These studies nd that returns on high-volume days tend to reverse
themselves.
A few studies also use returns and volume of individual stocks (e.g., Antoniewicz, 1993;
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Conrad, Hameed, and Niden, 1992; Morse, 1980; Stickel and Verrecchia, 1994). In par-
ticular, Antoniewicz nds that returns of individual stocks on high-volume days are more
sustainable than are returns on low-volume days. Stickel and Verrecchia nd that when
earnings announcements are accompanied by higher volume, returns are more sustainable
in the following days. The results of these two papers, from pooling together individual
returns and volume, contrasts with the result from aggregate returns and volume. How-
ever, these studies do not provide an explanation that reconciles the two phenomena, nor
do they examine the cross-sectional variation in the volume-return relation among the
stocks.
1
Our paper provides a model that reconciles the contrasting empirical results on the
volume-return relation at the aggregate and the individual levels. The model demonstrates
how these results are related to the cross-sectional variation in the volume-return relation.
Unlike CGW, we recognize information asymmetry as an important trading motive in
addition to risk sharing. We show that for stocks with low information asymmetry (like the
market indices and the big rms studied by CGW and LeBaron, 1992), returns following
high-volume days exhibit strong reversals, as in CGW. However, for stocks with high
information asymmetry, returns following high-volume days exhibit only weaker reversals
or even continuations, which is consistent with the ndings of Antoniewicz (1993) and
Stickel and Verrecchia (1994) who use pooled returns and volume of individual stocks.
Our analysis highlights the importance of information asymmetry in understanding the
dynamic volume-return relation and demonstrates the more general nature of this relation,
which was only partially captured by the aforementioned papers.
On the theoretical side, our model is very close to that of Wang (1994) but less com-
plex. Simplication allows us to obtain sharper predictions on the dependence of a stock's
dynamic volume-return relation on the extent of information asymmetry, which we test
empirically. Our paper is also related to a paper by Blume, Easley, and O'Hara (1994),
which examines the informational role of volume. In their model, investors can extract
useful information from both volume and prices. In our model, volume provides no ad-
ditional information to investors. However, the dynamic relation between volume and
returns allows observers of the economy to better understand its underlying characteris-
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In a recent paper, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that past volume provides valuable information
about future returns over horizons of six months. By assigning stocks to portfolios based on past volume
and price changes, they show that using the prior six-months-volume in combination with price changes
is superior to using past price changes alone in predicting long term returns. Specically, they show
that buying low-volume winners and selling past high-volume losers outperform a pure price momentum
strategy. The nature of their result is similar to that of Antoniewicz (1993), but at a longer horizon.
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tics, such as the degree of information asymmetry, which is our focus.
Other related papers include Brown and Jennings (1989) and Grundy and McNichols
(1989). In particular, Brown and Jennings examine the characteristics of return auto-
correlations when investors trade on private information. They do not consider volume,
which is partially exogenous in their model due to the presence of noise traders. We focus
on the joint behavior of return and volume because it provides more information about
the underlying economy.
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On the empirical side, our paper is related to Hasbrouck (1988, 1991) who utilizes
transactions data to examine the impact of trades on prices and quotes. He uses a
linear empirical model to capture how such an impact might be related to the inventory
control of specialists and to the private information behind trades. Even though we do
not focus on the actual trading process, in many ways our paper deals with the same
issues, namely, how trades with dierent motives generate dierent return dynamics.
Nonetheless, our paper is dierent in several ways. First, while Hasbrouck's analysis is
based on heuristic linear specications, our analysis is based on a theoretical model, which
leads to a particular non-linear specication. Second, Hasbrouck's analysis conditions on
a trade's direction, relying on a heuristic algorithm to infer its direction from publically
available data. We prefer to use volume that is not subject to errors introduced by trade
classication algorithms. Third, our analysis focuses on the cross-sectional dierence
among stocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the theoretical
predictions that we test. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and Section 4
provides our empirical results. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, we present a model of the stock market in which investors trade for both
allocation and information reasons. We use the model to show how the dynamic relation
between return and volume depends on the information asymmetry between investors.
Since our goal is to establish this dependence and to illustrate the economic forces behind
2
It should also be noted that many theoretical papers in market microstructure deal with the impact
of private information on asset prices (e.g., Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle,
1985). However, the assumption of a competitive market maker in these models makes prices follow a
martingale, eliminating richer dynamics.
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it, we keep the model as parsimonious as possible. We discuss possible generalizations of
the model toward the end of the section.
2.1 Economy
The economy is dened on a discrete time sequence, t = 0; 1; 2; : : : . There are two traded
securities, a riskless bond and a stock. The bond is in unlimited supply at a constant,
non-negative interest rate, r. The stock pays a dividend D
t+1
in period t + 1, which
consists of two additive components:
D
t+1
= F
t
+G
t
: (1)
Shares of the stock are traded in a competitive stock market. Let P
t
denote the ex-
dividend price of the stock at time t.
There are two classes of investors, 1 and 2, with relative population weight of ! and
1   !, respectively. Investors are identical within each class, but are dierent between
the classes in their endowments and information. For convenience, an investor in class i
is referred to as investor i, where i = 1; 2.
Each investor is initially endowed with x shares of the stock. He is also endowed with
a ow of income from a nontraded asset. In period t, investor i has Z
(i)
t
units of the
nontraded asset that pays N
t+1
per unit in the subsequent period.
At time t, all investors observe the current dividend of the stock (D
t
), its price (P
t
), the
current payo of the nontraded asset (N
t
), and their own endowment of the nontraded
asset (Z
(i)
t
for investor i). They also observe F
t
, the forecastable part of each stock's
next-period dividend. In addition, class 1 investors observe G
t
. Thus, they have private
information about future stock payos. The information set of investor i at time t is then
given by I
(1)
t
= fD;P;N; F;G; Z
(1)
g
[0; t]
and I
(2)
t
= fD;P;N; F; Z
(2)
g
[0; t]
, where fg
[0; t]
denotes the history of a set of variables from time 0 to t.
Each investor maximizes expected utility over his wealth next period of the following
form:
E

 e
 W
t+1




I
(i)
t

(2)
where  > 0 is the risk-aversion parameter.
All shocks (i.e., fF
t
; G
t
; N
t
; Z
(1)
t
; Z
(2)
t
8 tg) are assumed to be normally distributed
with zero mean and constant variances: 
2
F
for F
t
, 
2
G
for G
t
, 
2
N
for N
t
, and 
(i)
Z
2
for Z
(i)
t
,
respectively, where i = 1; 2. Furthermore, they are assumed to be mutually independent
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(contemporaneously and over time), except for D
t
and N
t
, which are correlated with
E[D
t
N
t
] = 
DN
. In addition, for convenience in exposition, we set the riskless interest
rate at zero and each investor's initial endowment of stock shares at zero (x = 0). (Thus,
the total supply of the stock is zero.) Without loss of generality, we set the investors' risk
aversion  at one.
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The model dened above captures two important motives for trading: allocation of
risk and speculation on future returns. Each investor holds the stock and the nontraded
asset in his portfolio. Since the returns on the two assets are correlated, as his holding of
the nontraded asset changes, each investor wants to adjust his stock positions to maintain
an optimal risk prole. This generates allocational trade in the model, which we refer
to as hedging trade.
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In addition, some investors might have private information about
future stock payos. As new private information arrives, they take speculative positions
in the stock in anticipation of high returns. This generates the informational trade in the
model that we refer to as speculative trade.
2.2 Equilibrium Price and Volume
Given a stock price process fP
t
g, the dollar return on one stock share is given by
R
t
 D
t
+ P
t
  P
t 1
(t = 1; 2; : : :) (3)
The return consists of two parts, a dividend and a capital gain. Let E
(i)
t
[R
t+1
] denote
investor i's conditional expectation of R
t+1
given his information at t, 
(i)
R
2
its conditional
variance, and X
(i)
t
his stock holding. (Here, 
(i)
R
2
, the conditional variance of stock returns
for investor i, has no time subscript because it remains constant over time.) We have the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 The economy dened above has an equilibrium in which investor i's stock
holding is
X
(i)
t
=
E
(i)
t
[R
t+1
]

(i)
R
2
 

DN

(i)
R
2
Z
(i)
t
=
E
(i)
t
[D
t+1
] P
t

(i)
R
2
 

DN

(i)
R
2
Z
(i)
t
(i = 1; 2) (4)
3
Our model, which uses Constant Absolute Risk Aversion preferences and normally distributed shocks,
exhibits homotheticity. That is, the implications of the model are invariant to proportional scaling of the
variances of all the shocks and the investors' risk aversion. Thus, it is convenient to express the results
to reect this invariance. We choose to let  = 1 and thank the referee for suggesting this.
4
Many papers have introduced nontraded assets to generate investors' hedging needs to trade in the
market. See, for example, Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) and Wang (1994).
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and the ex-dividend stock price is
P
t
= F
t
+
~
P
t
 F
t
+ aG
t
 

b
(1)
Z
(1)
t
+ b
(2)
Z
(2)
t

(5)
where E
(1)
t
[D
t+1
] = G
t
, E
(2)
t
[D
t+1
] = 

~
P
t
  b
(2)
Z
(2)
t

and a, b
(1)
, b
(2)
, 
(1)
R
2
, 
(2)
R
2
, and 
are constants.
Each investor's stock holding has two components. The rst component is proportional
to his risk tolerance and the risk-adjusted, expected stock return given his information.
This component reects the optimal trade-o between the return and risk of the stock.
The second component is proportional to the amount of his non-traded asset, and reects
his need to hedge the non-traded risk.
The equilibrium stock price at time t depends on F
t
and G
t
, and on the amounts of
both investors' non-traded asset, Z
(1)
t
and Z
(2)
t
, respectively. F
t
gives the expected next-
period dividend based on (non-price) public information. G
t
reects class 1 investors'
private information on the next dividend. Z
(1)
t
and Z
(2)
t
give the investors' need to use
the stock to hedge their nontraded risk.
An investor changes his stock position when there is a change in his expectation of
future stock returns or his exposure to nontraded risk. This generates trading in the
market. Given that trading is only between the two classes of investors, the volume of
trade, V
t
, is given by the change in the total stock holdings of either class. Thus,
V
t
= !jX
(1)
t
 X
(1)
t 1
j = (1 !)jX
(2)
t
 X
(2)
t 1
j: (6)
2.3 Dynamic Relation Between Return and Volume
In our model, returns are generated by three separate sources: public information on fu-
ture payos, investors' hedging trades and their speculative trades. The returns generated
by dierent sources exhibit dierent dynamics.
Returns generated by public news on future payos are independent over time. As
public information about future dividends arrives (i.e., the realization of F
t
at t), the
stock price changes to fully reect the public information. As Section 2.2 shows, the price
change has no impact on investors' stock demands, despite changes in their wealth. As a
result, expected future returns remain unchanged. In other words, public news on future
payos results in a white noise component in stock returns.
Returns generated by trading are serially correlated. When investors trade for hedging
reasons, the stock price adjusts to attract other investors to take the other side. This
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price change contains no information about the stock's future payos. Thus, a price
change generated by a hedging trade implies future returns of the opposite sign. For
example, when class 1 investors sell the stock to hedge their nontraded risk, the stock
price decreases, yielding a negative return for that period. However, the expected payo
in the next period stays the same. Hence, the decrease in the price leads to an increase in
the expected return in the next period. Thus, returns generated by hedging trades tend
to reverse themselves.
When investors trade for speculative reasons, the price changes to reect the informed
investors' expectation of the stocks' future payos. This expectation is fullled later on as
private information becomes public. Thus, a price change generated by speculative trade
implies future returns of the same sign. For example, when class 1 investors sell the stock
due to a negative signal on future stock dividends, the stock price decreases, yielding a
negative return for the current period. Since the price only partially reects the private
information (in a non-fully revealing equilibrium), the return in the next period is more
likely to be negative as the private information becomes public. Thus, returns generated
by speculative trade tend to continue themselves.
The actual dynamics of returns depend on the relative importance of the three return-
generating mechanisms. We are interested in returns generated by trading, with particular
attention to the relative amount of hedging trade versus speculative trade and their rel-
ative impact on stock prices. By analyzing the serial correlation of returns generated by
trading among investors, we could learn about the relative importance of dierent trading
motives. Therefore, we would like to separately identify the returns generated by trading
from those generated by public news on future payos, and examine their dynamics. We
use trading volume to facilitate this identication. We observe that in our model, price
changes generated by speculative or allocational trading must be accompanied by high
volume, but those generated by public news about payos do not. In other words, by con-
ditioning on the current volume return pair, we can (imperfectly) identify trade-generated
returns. (See CGW for a discussion of this point.) Based on those returns, we can fur-
ther examine how they might predict future returns. When all trades are hedging trades,
current returns together with high volume predict strong reversals in future returns (as
shown in CGW). When speculative trades are more important, current returns together
with high volume predict weaker reversals (or even continuation) in future returns, as
suggested in Wang (1994).
To analyze more formally how the relative importance of hedging trade versus spec-
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ulative trade might aect return dynamics, we rst compute the expectation of future
returns conditioned on both current return and volume. We present our result in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 From (5),
E[R
t+1
j
~
V
t
; R
t
] = 
1
R
t
  
2
~
V
t
tanh


~
V
t
R
t

(7)
where
~
V
t
 V
t
=E[V
t
] is volume normalized by its unconditional mean and 
1
, 
2
, and 
are constants. Moreover, 
2
 0 and   0.
Equation (7) forecasts future by returns using current return and volume. It is obvious
that given the current return, the higher the current trading volume implies stronger
reversal in the next return.
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We can further consider an approximation of the forecasting
equation when volume and return are small:
E[R
t+1
j
~
V
t
; R
t
] =


1
  
2
~
V
2
t

R
t
+ higher-order terms in
~
V
t
and R
t
(8)
where 
1
= 
1
and 
2
= 
2
  0. Equation (8) clearly illustrates the dynamic relation
between current return and volume and future return: Volume is related to return au-
tocorrelations. Even though this result can be stated in the general form of Equation
(7), we use the approximate form of Equation (8) in our future analysis for its intuitive
appeal. Given the small magnitudes of average daily volume and returns of individual
stocks, this approximation is reasonable.
Next, we examine how the dynamic volume-return relation in Equation (8) might de-
pend on the importance of speculative trade in the market, which is driven by information
asymmetry. For clarity of exposition, we set Z
(2)
t
= 0 for the rest of this section. Thus,
class 1 investors generate all the trades.
A natural measure of information asymmetry is 
2
G
, the variance of the dividend com-
ponent on which informed investors have private information. Thus, we consider how 
2
changes with 
2
G
, holding constant the total risk of the stock. The (unconditional) risk
of the stock has two components: uncertainty in dividend, given by 
2
D
 
2
F
+ 
2
G
, and
uncertainty in future price, given by 
2
~
P
for the uninformed investors.
When 
2
G
= 0, there is no information asymmetry and investors trade only to hedge
their nontraded risk. When 
2
G
> 0, there is information asymmetry and the informed
5
In the simple specication of the model, we set the total supply of the stock (x) at zero. Thus, the
unconditional mean of the excess stock return is zero. Since this paper focuses on the dynamics of stock
returns, this simplication does not aect our results.
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investors trade for hedging and speculative reasons. We then have the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3 For 
2
G
= 0,

2
= 
20


2
~
P

2
D
=
!
2


2
DN

2
Z

2
D
For 
2
G
> 0 but small and holding 
2
D
, 
2
~
P
constant,

2
= 
20
"
1  !
 
1

2
D
+
3
2
2
~
P
!#
+ o


2
G

(9)
which decreases with 
2
G
.
Thus, holding constant the risk of the stock, 
2
decreases with the degree of information
asymmetry between investors, which is measured by 
2
G
.
Although this result is stated only for a small 
2
G
when an analytical proof is available,
we also examine its validity numerically when 
2
G
is large. By computing 
2
for the
complete range of 
G
(between zero and 
2
D
) for a wide range of parameter values (of 
2
D
,

2
Z
, and 
DN
), we nd that the dependence of 
2
on 
2
G
is always negative.
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Propositions 2 and 3 show how current return and volume predict future returns, and
how this predictability depends on the relative signicance of hedging trade versus spec-
ulative trade. In a cross-sectional context, all else equal, stocks with higher information
asymmetry will have lower 
2
than will stocks with lower information asymmetry. It is
this dependence of the return-volume dynamics on the degree of information asymmetry
in the market, characterized in Equations (8) and (9), that we test empirically.
2.4 Discussion of the Model
Our model is similar to that of Wang (1994) with two simplifying assumptions. First,
shocks to the economy are independently (and identically) distributed over time. The
independence assumption implies that investors' private information is short-lived: It is
only about the next dividend, which is revealed after one period. Thus, the less-informed
investors do not have to solve the dynamic learning problem (and the corresponding
optimization problem for their stock demand), which simplies their policy.
7
Second,
6
Results of the numerical analysis are available upon request.
7
For dierent cases of long-lived private information in a competitive setting, see, for example, Brown
and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), He and Wang (1995), and Wang (1994).
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we assume that investors are myopic, which further simplies the investors' optimization
problem.
Our simplication gives sharper results about the dependence of the volume-return
relation on information asymmetry, as shown in Proposition 3, while Wang (1994) relies
on numerical analysis and provides only examples. However, our model has the restrictive
implication that 
2
remains non-negative even for high degrees of information asymmetry.
As shown in Wang (1994), when private information can be long-lived, 
2
can become
negative as the degree of information asymmetry increases. In our empirical analysis, we
allow this possibility.
We assume that investors have constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) and that assets
(the stock and the nontraded asset) have (conditionally) normally distributed payos.
The combination of these two assumptions allows closed form solutions for the model.
However, as a special feature of the CARA preferences, each investor's stock demand is
independent of his wealth. Hence, there is no income eect in investors' stock demand,
and public news on future asset payos (and the corresponding price change) does not
cause investors to trade in the market. Of course, for more general preferences, investors
do rebalance their portfolios in response to public news on future payos as their wealth
changes, giving rise to another motive for allocational trades. As mentioned earlier, our
model introduces a motive for allocational trade by including a set of nontraded assets in
investors' portfolio. We note that the detailed motive for allocational trades is not crucial
to our main result. This particular choice in the model is for tractability and simplicity.
Despite the simplifying assumptions of the model, it provides a clear illustration of
certain volume-return relations, which we believe to be more general than the model itself.
As discussed above, relaxing many of these assumptions is possible, but adds little to the
main thrust of the paper.
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3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Data and Sample Description
Our primary sample comprises of all common stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX.
From CRSP, we obtain data for daily return, price, number of shares traded and shares
8
There are assumptions in the model that are more substantial, such as those on the preferences and
distribution combination and the information structure. Relaxing those would signicantly change the
model.
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outstanding. We obtain quotes and bid-ask spreads data from the TAQ database. Our
sample period is from January 1st, 1993 to December 31st, 1998. We choose this six-year
sample period for two reasons. First, the TAQ database only starts at the beginning
of 1993. Second, the nature of our test requires that stock-specic parameters remain
constant over time, which may not be the case over a long period.
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During the sample
period, the CRSP database contains 3,538 stocks that were traded on the NYSE and
AMEX. To allow a more precise estimation of our time-series regressions, and a more
uniform cross-sectional comparison of the parameters, we further require that stocks in
the sample trade in at least two thirds of the days (1,000 days out of 1,516 possible trading
days). This requirement reduces our sample to 2,226 stocks.
Table 1 presents rms' characteristics for the entire sample and for three subgroups
according to size. For each rm i, we measure size (AvgCap
i
) as the average daily market
capitalization (number of shares outstanding multiplied by the daily closing price) over
the sample period. The market capitalization of rms in our sample ranges from $3.61M
to $147.82B. As indicated by the columns 2 and 3 of the table, both the average daily
number of shares traded (AvgTrd
i
) and the average share turnover (AvgTurn
i
), which is
the number of shares traded relative to shares outstanding, increase with rm size. For
example, the daily average turnover is 0.27% for the Small size group and is 0.355% for
the Large size group. The average share price (AvgPrc
i
in column 4) exhibits the same
pattern.
Using the data from TAQ, we construct a measure of a stock's bid-ask spread (BAsprd
i
).
In light of results in Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997), we use the opening
spread to capture the asymmetric information component of the spread. We then de-
ne the relative spread for each stock as the average of the daily opening percentage
spread (opening bid-ask spread divided by the opening mid-quote) over the sample pe-
riod. Consistent with many prior studies, the relative spread is high for the Small size
group (4.11%), and decreases monotonically with rm size (the average for rms in the
Large size group is only 0.84%).
3.2 Return, Volume, and Proxies for Information Asymmetry
We use daily returns and trading volume to analyze the impact of information asymmetry
on the dynamic volume-return relation. The main reason to use daily data is to be able to
9
In Section 4.2, we show that increasing the time horizon to ten instead of six years does not aect
our results.
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relate our results to those of previous studies (e.g., Antoniewicz, 1993; CGW; LeBaron,
1992; and Stickel and Verrecchia, 1994).
10
In Section 4.2 we consider an alternative
procedure to determine the appropriate time interval for our analysis empirically. The
return series we use for the estimation is the daily return of individual stocks from CRSP
(we test the sensitivity of our results to an alternative denition of returns that avoids
the potential bid-ask bounce problem in Section 4.3).
We use daily turnover as a measure of trading volume for individual stocks. We dene a
stock's daily turnover as the total number of shares traded in that day divided by the total
number of shares outstanding.
11
Since the daily time series of turnover is nonstationary,
we measure turnover in logs and detrend the resulting series. To avoid the problem of
zero daily trading volume, we add a small constant (0.00000255) to the turnover before
taking logs.
12
We detrend the resulting series by subtracting a 200-trading-day moving
average:
V
t
= logturnover
t
 
1
200
 1
X
s= 200
logturnover
t+s
where
logturnover
t
= log (turnover
t
+ 0:00000255) :
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics that describe the volume series used in the
estimation. While the rst-order autocorrelation is higher for larger stocks, the pattern
becomes less pronounced in the fth order and disappears in the tenth order. We test the
sensitivity of our results to alternative denitions of volume in Section 4.4.
As in CGW, we note that there is some slippage between the theoretical variables
in the model and those in the empirical part. Our model considers dollar returns per
share and normalized turnover, and the empirical analysis considers returns per dollar
and detrended log turnover for well-known reasons (e.g., potentially better distributional
properties). The dierence between the theoretical and corresponding empirical variables
10
CGW also consider the same relation between two-day returns and volume for the market and nd
it is still present, but weaker than that for daily data. However, the analysis of Conrad, Hameed, and
Niden (1992) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) indicate that volume can be informative for returns over
longer horizons.
11
Lo and Wang (2000) provide a theoretical justication for using turnover as a measure of trading
volume and a detailed study of the turnover of individual stocks.
12
The value of the constant is chosen to maximize the normality of the distribution of daily trading
volume. See Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986), Cready and Ramanan (1991), and Ajinkya and
Jain (1989) for an explanation.
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is mainly a matter of normalization. At the daily frequency that we focus on, the relation
among these variables should not be very sensitive to the normalizations used here.
To test Proposition 3, we also need a measure of information asymmetry for individual
stocks that represents the extent of informed trading. Since information asymmetry is not
directly observable, we must nd a suitable proxy for the empirical investigation. Previous
studies use several variables to measure information asymmetry, among which are bid-ask
spreads and market capitalization. Some researchers argue that rms with lower bid-ask
spreads (e.g., Lee, Mucklow, and Ready, 1993) and larger rms (e.g., Lo and MacKinlay,
1990) have a lower degree of information asymmetry or smaller adverse selection costs.
We use both proxies in our empirical analysis for a couple of reasons. First, since there
is no agreement on which proxy is the \best," we believe it is prudent not to rely on
only one of them. Second, by using more than one proxy, we can examine the sensitivity
of our results to various empirical representations of information asymmetry. For this
reason, we employ in Section 4.5 yet another proxy, the number of analysts who are
following a stock, which is linked to the degree of information production in the market.
Recent studies (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; and Easley, O'Hara, and Paperman,
1998) nd that rms with a larger analyst following have a lower degree of information
asymmetry or lower adverse selection costs. Hence, we use the number of analysts as a
proxy for information asymmetry, and we expect that the more analysts who are following
a stock, the less information asymmetry there is about it.
Even with an agreement on the proxies, there is still the question of how to use these
proxies in a cross-sectional test. The exact nature of the functional relation between
information asymmetry and the proxy is unknown. For example, the last column in
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that while the average bid-ask spread of the Large size group
is ve times smaller than that of the Small size group, the average rm size of the Small
group is almost 100 times smaller than that of the Large group (rst column). To work
with the two proxies in a unied framework, we adopt an ordinal transformation of the
variables. That is, we order the rms in an ascending order according to the proxy and
assign a rank of one to the rst rm (say, the smallest rm when rm size is the proxy),
and a rank of 2,226 to the last rm. We then divide the ordinal variable by 2,226 so that
its range is between zero and one. This monotonic transformation preserves the intuition
of the dierences between low and high information asymmetry without reading too much
into the specic dierences in magnitude.
13
13
See Johnston (1985) and references therein for a justication of this transformation.
14
The correlation between ORDCAP and ORDBA (the variables representing the ordi-
nal scales of AvgCap and BAsprd) is -0.876. Although this is a moderately high correla-
tion, it does not suggest that the two proxies represent the exact same phenomenon. We
have also repeated our experiments using either the raw variables (AvgCap and BAsprd)
or their log transformations. Our results are not materially aected by these alternative
representations.
3.3 Experiment Design
To test Proposition 3, we estimate the following relation for each individual stock:
R
it+1
= C0
i
+ C1
i
R
it
+ C2
i
 R
it
V
it
+ error
it+1
(10)
While the relation in Equation (8) has squared normalized volume entering the interaction
term, we estimate the relation with our denition of normalized volume, the detrended
log turnover, without squaring. We do this to allow for comparisons with prior empirical
studies (e.g., CGW). We test the relation in Equation (8) with a measure of squared
volume in Section 4.4.
In principle, trading in every stock contains both hedging and speculative elements.
The observed volume-return relation depends on the relative importance of one type of
trade relative to the other. We should see statistically signicant positive C2 coeÆcients
for stocks that are associated with very signicant speculative trade, while for stocks
with predominantly hedging trade, the C2 coeÆcients should be clearly negative. Stocks
for which neither speculative nor hedging trade dominates should have C2 coeÆcients
that are insignicantly dierent from zero. Moreover, the relation between C2 and the
signicance of speculative trade relative to hedging trade is monotonic.
To examine the relation between the importance of information asymmetry and the
C2 coeÆcients, we use both structured and nonstructured methods. To give a sense
of the underlying relation without imposing additional structure, we present a discrete
categorization analysis of the results by assigning the stocks into three groups of the
information asymmetry proxy. Proposition 3 implies the following relation:
C2
i
= f(A
i
) (11)
where A
i
is a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry of an individual stock.
For the bid-ask spread proxy, higher values of A
i
are associated with a higher degree of
information asymmetry, and we should observe that the mean of C2
i
is more positive for
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stocks with larger bid-ask spreads. For the market capitalization proxy, higher values of
A
i
are associated with a lower degree of information asymmetry, and so the mean of C2
i
should be more positive for smaller stocks.
Under the assumption that the relation is linear, we can estimate the cross-sectional
relation
C2
i
= a+ b  A
i
+ error
i
(12)
Here, we should see b > 0 when the information proxy used is the bid-ask spread and
b < 0 when the information proxy used is market capitalization.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Tests of the Dynamic Volume-Return Relation
Table 2 presents the results of using the bid-ask spread as the information asymmetry
proxy. For each stock in the sample, we estimate the parameters C0, C1, and C2 of
Equation (10). In Panel A, we present summary statistics for these 2226 time-series
regressions for each of the three bid-ask spread groups. The parameter that interest us is
the coeÆcient on the interaction term between return and volume, C2. As Proposition 3
predicts, the mean value of C2 decreases monotonically as we go from stocks with large
bid-ask spreads to stocks with small bid-ask spreads. Stocks with a higher information
asymmetry (large bid-ask spreads) are associated with positive coeÆcients (0.035 for the
High group). The mean value becomes negative for stocks in the Low group (-0.003). The
nonparametric analysis points in the same direction: Only 141 (out of 742) of the stocks
in the High group have negative coeÆcients, compared with 378 in the Low group.
As we expected, most C2 coeÆcients of rms with large bid-ask spreads are positive
and statistically dierent from zero, indicating the importance of speculative trade. For
many of the stocks with medium spreads, the C2 coeÆcients are not signicantly dierent
from zero, which is consistent with a balance of both speculative and hedging trades. For
stocks with small bid-ask spreads, many C2 coeÆcients are negative and statistically
signicant, indicating the dominance of hedging trades. The evidence in the table points
to a monotone positive relation between C2 and bid-ask spreads.
In Panel B, we use regression analysis to examine this relation. Equation (12) is
estimated using the bid-ask spread as the information asymmetry proxy, i.e., the depen-
dent variable is C2 (the inuence of volume on the autocorrelation of returns) and the
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independent variable is ORDBA (the bid-ask spread rank order). The spread coeÆcient
is positive and highly signicant, indicating that stocks with small spreads (i.e., lower
information asymmetry) have lower volume-return interaction terms. We note that when
ORDBA is used as the information asymmetry proxy, we can explain over 10% of the
cross-sectional variation in C2.
In Table 3, we use size (market capitalization) to proxy for information asymmetry.
The results are similar to those in Table 2. Because larger size is associated with lower
information asymmetry, the interaction coeÆcient C2 is the most positive for small rms
(high information asymmetry) and decreases as the size of the rm increases. In the
Low group, 167 stocks have negative C2 coeÆcient (mean value 0.030), but there are 354
stocks with negative C2 coeÆcient in the High group with a mean that is very close to zero.
The regression results in Panel B tell the same story: There is a statistically signicant
negative relation between our proxy for information asymmetry and the volume-return
interaction parameter.
The results in these two tables are consistent with the prediction of Proposition 3.
Using two dierent information proxies, we nd that following high volume, stocks that
are associated with more informed trading exhibit persistence in their returns and stocks
with less informed trading exhibit reversals.
While we attribute the cross-sectional variation in C2 to dierent degrees of informa-
tion asymmetry (or speculative trading), it may also be attributed to other factors such
as dierences in liquidity across stocks. In particular, for less-liquid stocks, high volume
is associated with a higher price impact and a larger subsequent return reversal than for
more-liquid stocks. Hence, less-liquid stocks should have more negative C2 coeÆcients.
However, natural candidates for stocks with lower liquidity are those stocks with small
market capitalizations or large bid-ask spreads. Hence, liquidity considerations should
cause a larger return reversal following high-volume days for lower market capitalization
or large bid-ask spread stocks. This is the opposite of what we nd. If a liquidity eect
exists, our empirical ndings suggest that it is dominated by the information eect.
For the results presented in Tables 2 and 3, we estimate both the time-series and the
cross-sectional relations by using OLS. One possible concern is whether this experiment
design is robust to potential econometric problems. One econometric problem could be
that the estimated relation in the time-series regression is aected by autocorrelated
errors. In this case, a lagged dependent variable among the regressors precludes using OLS
for the estimation. To examine how this problem might aect our results, we use a test
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developed by Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978a, 1978b) to identify the most appropriate
error structure. For each stock, we test for white noise against the alternative of an
autoregressive error structure of orders one through ve. We decided to limit the possible
orders to ve after a lengthy inspection of some stocks. We use a 5% signicance level to
reject the white noise hypothesis. If the test is signicant for any order p < 5, but not for
higher orders, we test again with the null of AR(p) against an autoregressive structure of
orders higher than p, but only up to order ve. After identifying the appropriate order,
we estimate the relation in Equation (10) using maximum likelihood with the suitable
autoregressive structure. We perform this procedure separately for each stock.
Using these time-series estimated C2 coeÆcients, we then re-run the cross-sectional
regressions with the information asymmetries proxies as the dependent variables. The
results are presented in Table 4, Panel A. These results are similar to the OLS ndings
reported in Tables 2 and 3, and show the same strong relation with the information asym-
metry proxies. Therefore, our results do not appear to be are sensitive to autocorrelation
of the error terms in the time-series estimations. To assess the sensitivity of our results to
the order identication algorithm, we repeat all estimations identifying the appropriate
error structure only by the white noise test against an AR structure. Panel B of Table 4
presents the results of this specication. Our results appear robust to the exact manner
in which the appropriate autoregressive order is identied.
Another possible econometric problem is that if the errors of Equation (10) are cor-
related across stocks, the C2
i
estimates will not be independent. When we estimate
Equation (12), the standard error of b is then biased and tests of signicance are diÆcult
to interpret. Because a cross-correlation of the errors most likely arises from the sensitiv-
ity of the returns to missing common factors, one way to decrease such cross-correlation
is to model the factors directly. Following Jorion (1990), we use a market proxy to model
the missing common factors for the purpose of decreasing cross-correlations of the error
terms. We estimate the following time-series relation for each stock:
R
it+1
= D0
i
+D1
i
R
it
+D2
i
R
it
V
it
+D3
i
R
mt+1
+ error
it+1
(13)
where R
mt+1
is the return on a value-weighted portfolio comprised of all common stocks
that trade on the NYSE or AMEX, and which have valid return and volume information
in the CRSP database for that day. We then estimate the cross-sectional relation:
D2
i
= a+ b  A
i
+ error
i
(14)
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Table 5 reports the results of estimating Equation (14). The b coeÆcient that measures the
relation between the information asymmetry proxy and the inuence of volume on return
autocorrelations is positive and signicant for ORDBA, and negative and signicant for
ORDCAP.
Another potential problem has its root in Equation (8) from Proposition 2 where
the dynamic volume-return relation is developed using an approximation that ignores
higher-order, nonlinear terms in the product of volume and return. if the product is very
large, the approximation may not be good. We could trim observations above a certain
bound, but the problem is to choose a sensible bound. So the approach we choose to
take is to use an econometric methodology that identies observations that are too large
relative to a linear structure (i.e., outliers that could be the results of nonlinearities) and
eliminate them from the analysis. The methodology that we use is the two-stage least
trimmed squares (see Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987). In the rst stage, the least trimmed
squares (LTS) estimator is applied to the relation. The estimator minimizes the sum of
the smallest h residuals, where h =
2
3
n and n is the number of observations. We use the
residuals from the LTS estimation to create weights that identify an observation as an
outlier if its residual is too large relative to a measure of the standard errors.
14
In the
second stage, we use these weights in a weighted least squares (WLS) estimation of the
cross-sectional relation. We then report the results that come out of the second stage
estimation.
The two-stage LTS therefore enables us to estimate a cleaner linear relation. It is
much less inuenced by possible nonlinearities that might produce observations that are
too far from the linear approximation, and which could result in biased slope coeÆcients.
Table 6 presents the results of applying the above procedure to our data. In Panel A,
we estimate each time-series regression using the two-stage LTS methodology. Then,
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The LTS estimator is given by:
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are the ordered squared residuals.
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we estimate Equation (12), the cross-sectional regression, by using OLS. The results are
similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3: The coeÆcients of the information asymmetry
proxies are highly signicant and in the right direction. Hence, it does not seem as if very
large observations are adversely aecting the estimates of the parameters C2.
Because we do not know the functional form of the relation between information
asymmetry and the proxy we use, we can also apply the two-stage LTS approach to our
cross-sectional estimation. We use the C2 estimates that come out of the OLS time-series
estimation to allow for a cleaner comparison with the results in Tables 2 and 3. Panel B
of Table 6 presents the result of estimating the cross-sectional regression using two-stage
LTS. The results are similar to those of the OLS estimation.
Lastly, we repeat our cross-sectional analysis using the non-parametric Spearman cor-
relations. We wish to measure the association between the C2 coeÆcients and the in-
formation asymmetry proxies without imposing the OLS assumptions (e.g., normality of
the residuals). The Spearman correlation between C2 and ORDBA is 0.326 (asymptotic
standard error 0.02), and the correlation between C2 and ORDCAP is -0.26 (asymptotic
standard error 0.02). Hence, the Spearman correlations point to the same conclusions as
all our other econometric procedures.
We can ask several questions about the results presented so far. First, how do our
choices for the length of the time-series estimation period or the daily intervals for return
and volume aect our results? Second, can our results be attributed to the eect of bid-
ask bounce? Third, how sensitive are our results to the exact denition of volume that we
use? Fourth, can we relate our ndings about information asymmetry to a variable that is
more directly associated with information production? Fifth, is rm-specic information
asymmetry a driving force behind the dynamic volume-return relation or does the relation
disappear when we eliminate market-wide variations? The following sections address these
questions.
4.2 Alternative Lengths of Time Intervals
It is possible that the appropriate measurement period diers across stocks. For example,
for an infrequently traded stock, the period could be several days, so that more trades
are captured within the period. We might choose the appropriate measurement periods
to equate the quantities of noise trading (on average) across stocks. The measurement
interval is longer for stocks with little noise trading than it is for stocks with a lot of
noise trading. While we do not have a measure of noise trading, we can use the typical
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turnover of a stock as a proxy for the normal level of trading. A typical trading intensity
measured by the stock's median turnover is less sensitive to informational or allocational
volume shocks.
Therefore, we calculate the median daily turnover for each stock over the sample
period (MedTurn), and assign all stocks into three groups according to their median
turnover. The average MedTurn for the three groups are 0.0634%, 0.1691%, and 0.384%,
respectively. we note that the average MedTurn of the High group is about twice that
of the Medium group and about ve times that of the Low group. (The proportions
are similar when we use the cross-sectional median rather the average of each group.)
Therefore, given a daily interval for the most active stocks, we choose a two-day interval
as the most appropriate for the Medium group, and a ve-day interval for the Low turnover
group. To calculate the return and turnover series for the Medium and Low groups, we
compound returns and sum the turnover for the days in the interval.
We then perform a separate time-series analysis for each stock. A stock in the High
MedTurn group that is listed for the entire sample period will have 1,516 observations
in the regressions, while a similar stock in the Medium (Low) MedTurn group will have
758 (303) observations. Taking the C2 coeÆcient from each individual stock's time-series
regression, we estimate the cross-sectional relation in Equation (12). We present the
cross-sectional results in Table 7, Panel A. The bid-ask spread coeÆcient is positive and
highly signicant, and the size coeÆcient is negative and highly signicant. Our results do
not appear to be driven by the choice of the daily interval for the time-series regressions.
Thus, whether we x a time interval (a day in our experiment) or a given quantity of
noise trading (as the current test implies) does not aect our ndings.
In Panel B of Table 7, we use ten instead of six years to estimate the time-series
regressions. This experiment allows us to check the sensitivity of our results to the length
of the estimation period. We estimate the volume-return interaction parameters (C2) in
this panel by using data from 1989 through 1998. The coeÆcients of the information
asymmetry proxies in the cross-sectional analysis have the right signs and are highly
statistically signicant.
15
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While not reported in a table, we have also conducted the experiment with a sample of NYSE and
AMEX stocks using the period 1983-1992. The results are the same as those presented in the paper.
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4.3 Information Eects vs. Bid-Ask Bounce Eects
Many studies show that short-horizon returns of individual stock exhibit negative auto-
correlation (e.g., French and Roll, 1986; Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Conrad, Kaul, and
Nimalendran, 1991; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995; Canina, Michaely, Thaler, and Wom-
ack, 1998). These autocorrelations are more pronounced in small stocks than in large
stocks. French and Roll (1986) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) show that the rst
order autocorrelation of daily returns is negative for small stocks, increases with the size
of the rm, and is positive for large rms. Our sample shows the same results. The rst-
order autocorrelation of daily returns is negative for stocks with large bid-ask spreads
(-0.088) and small stocks (-0.076). It is positive but very small for large stocks (0.003)
and stocks with small bid-ask spreads (0.01). These autocorrelations are similar in sign
and relative magnitude to the C1 coeÆcients from Tables 2 and 3.
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) suggest that these empirical ndings are consistent with
security returns that reect three inuences: a positively autocorrelated common com-
ponent, a white noise component, and a negative autocorrelation eect induced by mi-
crostructure phenomena such as bid-ask bounce. French and Roll (1986) suggest that the
positive autocorrelation arises when the market does not incorporate information as soon
as it is released. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) attribute the negative autocorrelation to
inventory control by specialists.
Our model shows how volume should interact with the autocorrelation of returns.
For stocks with more information asymmetry, greater volume should make the rst-order
autocorrelation more positive (hence, a positive C2) due to the partial adjustment of
prices to information. For stocks with less information asymmetry, greater volume should
make the rst-order autocorrelation more negative (hence a negative C2) due to the return
reversal associated with liquidity shocks. However, for small stocks or stocks with large
bid-ask spreads, the prediction of our model and the bid-ask bounce eect both operate
in the same direction. We show that for stocks with large bid-ask spreads that exhibit
negative return autocorrelation, increased volume makes the autocorrelation less negative
(a positive C2). We claim that the positive C2 is the result of a high degree of information
asymmetry. However, we would expect a positive C2 if more volume decreases the bid-ask
bounce eect.
To examine this issue, we generate a return series that is free from bid-ask bounce.
Using the TAQ database, we identify the end-of-day quote for all days in our sample period
for all stocks (except Berkshire Hathaway Inc. that is excluded due to its abnormal price
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range). We then construct a return series from the mid-quotes, and adjust for stock and
cash distributions using information from the CRSP database. We note that this return
series is less reliable than the CRSP series used in the main analysis. First, there are more
days without a valid end-of-day quote in the TAQ database than there are days without
a valid return in the CRSP database. Each day without an end-of-day quote results in
two days without valid mid-quote returns. Second, the intraday quote data in TAQ could
contain more errors than the heavily used CRSP return series.
The mid-quote return series eliminates most of the negative autocorrelation in the
returns of small stocks. For example, the rst-order autocorrelation for the group of
small stocks (742 rms) goes from -0.076 to -0.015, and that of the group of stocks
with large bid-ask spreads goes from -0.088 to -0.014. Our goal is to estimate the time-
series regressions using the mid-quote returns, and then examine the impact of these new
estimates on the cross-sectional relation that our model predicts (the relation between C2
and the information asymmetry proxies). We re-estimate Equation (10) with the mid-
quote return series for the rms in our sample. An indication that the aforementioned
problems with respect to the mid-quote return series might have some eect is that the
time-series regressions using TAQ returns produce a few outliers of the C2 coeÆcient
while the time-series regressions using CRSP returns do not produce any outliers. Hence,
we estimate the cross-sectional relations using the two-stage LTS procedure described in
Section 4.1 to identify and eliminate the inuence of outliers. Table 8 presents the cross-
sectional regressions of ORDBA and ORDCAP on the interaction parameter C2. The
information asymmetry proxies have the appropriate signs and are statistically signicant.
We note, though, that the proxies explain less of the variation in the C2 coeÆcients than
they do in the cross-sectional regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3.
4.4 Alternative Denitions of Volume
Since there is a slight dierence between our de-trended volume measure and the theoret-
ical volume measure, Table 9 presents the results using alternative denitions of volume.
In Panel A, we dene volume as the daily share turnover of a stock, without taking
any transformation or detrending. We re-estimate the time-series relation in Equation
(10) with this alternative volume denition. The results of the cross-sectional regressions
show a statistically signicant relation, in the appropriate direction, between C2 and both
information asymmetry proxies.
In Panel B, we perform a more direct test of the relation in Equation (8) that comes
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out of our theoretical model. In the theoretical model, it is the squared volume, rather
than a linear term, that aects the subsequent period's returns. We dene volume as
the logarithm of (1 + daily number of shares traded).
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Then we estimate the following
relation:
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The resulting cross-sectional analysis shows the same pattern as in Tables 2 and 3. In
fact, it appears that the relation is even stronger. Both information asymmetry proxies
explain over 16% of the cross-sectional variation in the parameter C2.
4.5 Analyst Following as a Proxy for Information Production
While the information asymmetry proxies we use in the main analysis have received much
attention in the literature, several recent papers discuss the relation between the number
of analysts who follow a stock and information asymmetry or adverse selection costs.
Early papers used the number of analysts as a direct proxy for informed trading, but
recent studies by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), and Easley, O'Hara, and Paperman
(1998) nd that rms that are followed by a larger number of analysts have a lower degree
of information asymmetry or lower adverse selection costs.
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Thus, the number of analysts
appears to be negatively related to the degree of information asymmetry.
Using the number of analysts as a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry
has an intuitive appeal since it directly relates to information production in the market.
Nonetheless, this empirical proxy has its share of problems. First, there is still some doubt
about the direction and strength of the proxy's relation to the degree of information
asymmetry. Second, many stocks are not regularly followed by analysts. Third, the
number of analysts is heavily inuenced by membership in a particular industry. Fourth,
there is relatively little cross-sectional variation in the number of analysts who follow
stocks. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that the number of analysts will not
exhibit as strong a cross-sectional relation with C2 as will our two main proxies, bid-ask
spread and market capitalization.
To construct the analyst-following proxy, we look for the monthly number of analysts
who provide I/B/E/S with end-of-scal-year earnings forecast for the current year. We
16
To avoid taking the log of zero on days without trading, we add the small constant (1.00) to the daily
number of shares traded before making the logarithm transformation.
17
See Easley, O'Hara, and Paperman (1998) for a discussion of the issue and additional references.
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dene NumEst
i
to be the average monthly number of analysts over the sample period
(six years). ORDEST
i
is the ordinal scale of NumEst
i
(constructed like ORDBA and
ORDCAP), where two rms that have the same number of analysts receive the same
rank. Out of the 2,226 rms in our sample, 2,035 are followed by at least one analyst.
Not surprisingly, the majority of rms without analyst coverage are in the Small size
group. Only 571 out of 742 rms in the Small size group had forecast records in the
I/B/E/S database. The average number of analysts is 2.45 for those small rms that are
being followed, compared with 16.51 for rms in the Large size group.
Table 10 contains the results of the cross-sectional regression in Equation (12) using
either NumEst or ORDEST as the information asymmetry proxy. The coeÆcient of
NumEst is negative and statistically signicant and so is the coeÆcient of ORDEST,
though the relation is weaker than the cross-sectional results reported in Tables 2 and
3, where we use our two main proxies. Interpreting this result is straightforward. The
more analysts who cover a rm, the better the production of information about the rm's
prospects. Investors in a rm with more information production have fewer opportunities
to engage in speculative trading, and therefore most trading in these rms' securities
is motivated by hedging. Our results are consistent with the evidence in Brennan and
Subrahmanyam (1995) and Easley, O'Hara, and Paperman (1998), who nd that the
number of analysts is negatively related to the degree of information asymmetry.
4.6 Firm-Specic Information Asymmetry
It is possible, and even likely, that both market-wide and rm-specic factors drive the
trading and returns of individual stocks. In the model presented in Section 2, trading
is only generated by the rm-specic hedging needs and private information. Thus, we
focus on the dierent degree of rm-specic private information as the main factor that
produces the cross-sectional variation in the dynamic volume-return relation. The model's
prediction on the relation between volume and return autocorrelation would therefore
most reasonably apply to the rm-specic components of trading and returns.
We can test empirically whether the volume-return relation has a rm-specic compo-
nent or if it disappears when we eliminate market-wide variations. To do so, we use market
models to decompose both the volume and return series. Each series is decomposed into a
systematic (market) component and a non-systematic (rm-specic) component. To im-
plement the market models, we construct market return and volume series. The market's
return for a specic day is dened as the return on a value-weighted portfolio comprised
25
of all common stocks that traded on the NYSE or AMEX, and which have valid return
and volume information in the CRSP database for that day. We dene the market's
turnover in an analogous fashion as the value-weighted average of the turnover of the
individual stocks in the portfolio of all NYSE and AMEX common stocks. To maintain
compatibility, we detrend the log market turnover series, just as we do with the turnover
series of each individual stock. While sensible, this paper does not explicitly model this
particular volume decomposition. In a recent study, Lo and Wang (2000) present a formal
justication for a market model of volume, which we use here.
We re-estimate Equation (10) by using residual returns and residual volume from the
respective market models. We then examine cross-sectional dierences in the resulting C2
coeÆcients of the volume-return interaction terms. Table 11 presents the cross-sectional
regressions of the information asymmetry proxies on the C2 coeÆcients. The coeÆcient
of ORDBA is positive and statistically signicant, and the coeÆcient of ORDCAP is
negative and statistically signicant. These results suggest that rm-specic information
asymmetry is a driving force behind the relation between volume and return autocorre-
lations.
5 Conclusions
We construct a simple model in which investors trade in the stock market for both hedging
and speculation motives. We use the model's insights to investigate the dynamic relation
between volume and returns. According to our model, returns generated by hedging-
motivated trades reverse themselves, while returns generated by speculation-motivated
trades tend to continue themselves. The relative signicance of these two types of trades
for an individual stock determines whether returns that are accompanied by trading vol-
ume exhibit negative or positive autocorrelation.
We test the model's predictions by using daily return and volume data for NYSE and
AMEX stocks. We look at how volume aects the rst-order autocorrelation of daily
stock returns. To proxy for information asymmetry, we use bid-ask spreads (larger bid-
ask spreads imply a higher degree of information asymmetry) and market capitalization
(larger rms are associated with less information asymmetry).
The empirical results support the predictions of the model on the nature of the dynamic
volume-return relation. Stocks that are associated with a high degree of informed trading
exhibit more return continuation on high-volume days, and stocks that are associated with
a low degree of informed trading show more return reversals on high-volume days. Our
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results are robust to various econometric specications, alternative denitions of volume,
and changes in the lengths of the measurement intervals and the estimation period. We
also show that the dynamic volume-return relation remains signicant after accounting
for possible bid-ask bounce eects.
We use analyst following as an additional proxy for the degree of information produc-
tion about a rm. We nd that in the portion of our sample for which we could nd
data on analyst following, the dynamic volume-return relation shows the same pattern as
with the other information asymmetry proxies. We also investigate whether rm-specic
information asymmetry is a driving force behind this relation. We use market models to
decompose returns and volume, and nd that the relation holds even when we use only
rm-specic (residual) returns and volume.
The empirical ndings support the general notion that volume does tell us something
about future price movements. The analysis also suggests that the actual dynamic relation
between volume and returns depends on the underlying forces driving trading. Explicitly
modeling these driving forces allows us to use volume eectively in making an inference
about returns. In particular, by considering both allocational and informational trading,
our model gives rise to realistic predictions that seem to encompass the variety that
prevails in the market. It is this feature of the model that enables us to reconcile the
previous empirical ndings of return reversals after high-volume days exhibited by large
rms and indices, with the return continuation after high-volume days shown by average
rms. The key to generating both results is our ability to use information asymmetry to
capture the cross-sectional variation in the dynamic volume-return relation of individual
stocks.
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
The sample contains 2,226 stocks.  Included in the sample are all common stocks with information in the CRSP 
database that traded on the NYSE or AMEX between 1993 and 1998 and that had at least 1,000 days with trading. 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics by size groups. For each firm, AvgCapi is the average daily market 
capitalization (number of shares outstanding multiplied by the daily closing price). AvgTrd i is the average number 
of shares traded daily. AvgTurn i is the average daily turnover (number of shares traded divided by the number of 
shares outstanding), and AvgPrc i is the average price of a firm’s stock over the sample period. BAsprd i is the 
average daily opening percentage spread (opening bid-ask spread divided by the opening midquote) over the sample 
period from the TAQ database. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the volume series used in the time-series 
regressions. We define the daily volume series of a stock as the detrended, log-transformed daily turnover series. We 
report the averages for the entire sample and for three size groups of the mean, standard deviation, and selected 
autocorrelation coefficients of the volume series of the individual stocks. 
 
Panel A: Characteristics of the Entire Sample and Three Size-Based Subsamples 
 
   AvgCap 
(in million $) 
AvgTrd 
(in 100s)  
AvgTurn 
(in %) 
AvgPrc 
(in $) 
BAsprd 
(in %) 
Entire Sample  Mean  2,587.55 1,997 0.321 25.59 2.19
  Median 473.52 672 0.258 22.40 1.38
  Std. Dev 8,019.00 3,844 0.255 20.49 2.33
  Minimum 3.61 2 0.007 0.39 0.25
  Maximum 147,817.21 52,735 2.837 330.45 19.51
  Observations 2226 2226 2226 2225 2225
Size Group:    Mean  85.97 288 0.270 10.84 4.11
Small  Median 75.96 164 0.212 8.90 3.12
  Std. Dev 58.18 408 0.213 7.79 2.99
  Observations 742 742 742 742 741
Size Group:  Mean  525.98 918 0.338 23.93 1.62
Medium  Median 473.52 601 0.273 22.91 1.35
  Std. Dev 237.23 994 0.263 11.24 1.13
  Observations 742 742 742 742 742
Size Group:  Mean  7,150.69 4,786 0.355 42.01 0.84
Large  Median 3,111.11 2,863 0.291 37.20 0.75
  Std. Dev 12,714.35 5,597 0.277 24.17 0.48
  Observations 742 742 742 741 742
 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of the Volume (Detrended Log Turnover) Series 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
First 
Autocorrelation
Fifth 
Autocorrelation
Tenth 
Autocorrelation
# of stocks 
Entire Sample 0.028 1.068 0.370 0.193 0.143 2226
Size group: Low 0.013 1.537 0.313 0.182 0.138 742
Size group: Medium 0.038 1.000 0.366 0.196 0.148 742
Size group: High 0.034 0.668 0.430 0.200 0.144 742
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Table 2 
Bid-Ask Spread and the Influence of Volume on the Autocorrelation of Returns  
 
This table shows the relation between information asymmetry and the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of 
stock returns.  We use the average daily opening percentage spread of a stock over the sample period (BAsprd i) as a 
proxy for information asymmetry. For each stock we measure the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of 
stock returns by the parameter C2i from the following regression:  
Return i,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Return t + C2i*Volumei,t*Return i,t + errori,t+1  
where Volume i,t  is the daily detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Return i,t is the daily return of an 
individual stock in the CRSP database.  In Panel A, we report the mean value of each parameter for three groups 
(Low, Medium, and High) of the information asymmetry proxy (BAsprd). We also note the number of negative 
parameters and the number of statistically significant (at the 10% level) parameters.   
In Panel B, we provide an analogous analysis using the following cross-sectional regression: 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
where ORDBA is a variable representing the ordinal scale of BAsprd. T-statistics appear in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Categorical Analysis  
 C0 C1 C2 tC0 tC1 tC2 R
2 (%) BAsprd 
 #<0 #<0 #<0 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64  (in %) 
Low 0.000770 0.013323 -0.002814 1.698 0.336 -0.096 0.564 0.719 
n=742 30 328 378 409 337 240   
         
Medium 0.000722 0.010931 0.003168 1.239 0.188 0.232 0.921 1.417 
n=742 74 326 357 250 431 257   
         
High 0.000740 -0.120346 0.035495 0.709 -4.003 2.066 2.754 4.428 
n=742 167 609 141 135 548 438   
 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis  
Dependent  variable a b R2(%) Observations 
C2 -0.015921 
(-7.863) 
0.055716 
(15.891) 
10.197 2,226 
 
 36 
Table 3 
Market Capitalization and the Influence of Volume on the Autocorrelation of Returns  
 
This table shows the relation between information asymmetry and the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of 
stock returns.  We use the average market capitalization of a firm over the sample period (AvgCapi) as a proxy for 
information asymmetry.  For each stock we measure the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns 
by the parameter C2i from the following regression:  
Return i,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Return t + C2i*Volumei,t*Return i,t + errori,t+1  
where Volume i,t  is the daily detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Return i,t is the daily return of an 
individual stock in the CRSP database. In Panel A, we report the mean value of each parameter for three groups 
(Low, Medium, and High) of the information asymmetry proxy (AvgCap). We also note the number of negative 
parameters and the number of statistically significant (at the 10% level) parameters.  In Panel B, we provide an 
analogous analysis using the following cross-sectional regression: 
C2i  = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
where ORDCAP is a variable representing the ordinal scale of AvgCap. T-statistics appear in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Categorical Analysis  
 C0 C1 C2 tC0 tC1 tC2 R
2 (%) AvgCap 
 #<0 #<0 #<0 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64  (in million $) 
Low 0.000784 -0.104234 0.030277 0.843 -3.538 1.848 2.729 85.97 
n=742 139 557 167 157 550 429   
         
Medium 0.000672 0.005492 0.004852 1.178 0.028 0.289 0.996 525.98 
n=742 95 348 355 258 433 284   
         
High 0.000776 0.002650 0.000719 1.625 0.032 0.065 0.514 7150.69 
n=742 37 358 354 379 333 222   
 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis  
Dependent variable a b R2(%) Observations 
C2 0.034081 
(16.488) 
-0.044242 
(-12.362) 
6.430 2,226 
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Table 4 
Alternative Econometric Specifications: Autoregressive Structure  
 
For each stock, we measure the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns by the parameter C2i 
from the following regression:  
Return i,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Return t + C2i*Volumei,t*Return i,t + errori,t+1  
where Volumei,t  is the daily detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Return i,t is the daily return of an 
individual stock in the CRSP database. For each stock, we test for white noise against the alternative of an 
autoregressive error structure of orders one through five using the Breusch-Godfrey test. We use a 5% significance 
level to reject the white noise hypothesis. In Panel A, we identify the most appropriate autoregressive structure using 
Algorithm A as follows: If the test is significant for any order p<5 but not for higher orders, we test again with the 
null of AR(p) against an autoregressive structure of orders higher than p, but only up to order five. After identifying 
the appropriate order, we estimate the above relation using maximum likelihood with the suitable autoregressive 
structure. In Panel B, we identify the autoregressive structure using Algorithm B, which uses only the white noise 
test against an AR structure for each individual stock. Both panels report the results of the cross-sectional 
regressions: 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
where ORDBA and ORDCAP are variables representing the ordinal scales of BAsprd and AvgCap, respectively. T-
statistics appear in parentheses. 
  
 
Panel A: Autoregressive Structure Identified Using Algorithm A 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
-0.015298 
(-7.048) 
0.060185 
(16.014) 
10.339 2,226 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.038386 
(17.303) 
-0.047135 
(-12.271) 
6.341 2,226 
 
 
Panel B: Autoregressive Structure Identified Using Algorithm B 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a B R2(%) Observations 
-0.015485 
(-7.154) 
0.060403 
(16.118) 
10.459 2,226 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.038443 
(17.376) 
-0.047403 
(-12.374) 
6.442 2,226 
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Table 5 
Alternative Econometric Specifications: Sensitivity to Common Factor  
 
For each stock, we measure the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns by the parameter D2i 
from the following time-series regression:  
Return i,t+1 = D0i + D1i*Return t + D2i*Volumei,t*Return i,t + D3*MktRett+1 + errori,t+1  
MktRett+1 is the return on a value-weighted portfolio comprised of all common stocks that traded on the NYSE or 
AMEX that have valid return and volume information in the CRSP database for that day.  The incorporation of 
MktRett+1 in the time-series regressions is intended to reduce potential correlation of the errors across stocks that 
arises from sensitivity to common factors. We report the results of the cross-sectional regressions: 
D2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
D2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
where ORDBA and ORDCAP are variables representing the ordinal scales of BAsprd and AvgCap, respectively. T-
statistics appear in parentheses. 
 
 
D2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
-0.005528 
(-2.795) 
0.043256 
(12.631) 
6.693 2,226 
 
D2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.031677 
(15.745) 
-0.031121 
(-8.934) 
3.465 2,226 
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Table 6 
Alternative Econometric Specifications: Least Trimmed Squares 
 
For each stock, we measure the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns by the parameter C2i 
from the following regression:  
Return i,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Return t + C2i*Volumei,t*Return i,t + errori,t+1  
where Volume i,t  is the daily detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Return i,t is the daily return of an 
individual stock in the CRSP database. We estimate this relation in two stages. In the first stage, we use a least 
trimmed squares (LTS) estimator to identify outliers (by minimizing the sum of the h smallest squared residuals, 
where h=2/3 of the observations for each stock). In the second stage, we use a weighted least squares (WLS) 
estimation in which we make the weights on the outliers identified in the first stage equal to zero. The C2i 
parameters for the cross-sectional estimation are taken from the WLS estimation. In Panel A, we report the results of 
the OLS cross-sectional regressions: 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
where ORDBA and ORDCAP are variables representing the ordinal scales of BAsprd and AvgCap, respectively. In 
Panel B, we apply the two-stage LTS estimation to the cross-sectional, rather than the time-series, regressions. We 
take the C2i coefficients from the OLS time series regressions that were presented in Tables 2 and 3, but we use LTS 
to estimate the relations with the information asymmetry proxies. We present the results of the second-stage WLS 
estimation. T-statistics appear in parentheses. 
  
 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Trimmed Squares Applied to Time-Series Regressions 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
-0.011487 
(-5.483) 
0.049199 
(13.562) 
7.638 2,226 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.032918 
(15.487) 
-0.039572 
(-10.752) 
4.942 2,226 
 
 
Panel B: Two-Stage Least Trimmed Squares Applied to Cross-Sectional Regressions 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a B R2(%) Observations 
-0.019349 
(-10.40) 
0.060732 
(19.00) 
14.328 2,226 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.034651 
(18.57) 
-0.046424 
(-14.25) 
8.586 2,226 
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Table 7 
Alternative Lengths of Time Intervals 
 
Panel A replaces the daily interval for measuring return and volume with an alternative interval that allows for 
roughly the same level of noise trading across stocks. We use the median daily turnover (MedTurn) of a stock as a 
measure of the normal level of trading. We group all stocks into three categories (High, Medium and Low) 
according to their MedTurn. We use a daily interval for stocks in the High group, a two-day interval for stocks in the 
Medium group, and a five-day interval for stocks in the Low group (so that the average turnover across groups is 
equal). We calculate the return and turnover series for a stock in the medium and low groups by compounding daily 
returns and linearly adding turnover for the days in each interval. For each stock, we measure the influence of 
volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns by the parameter C2i from the following regression:  
Return i,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Return t + C2i*Volumei,t*Return i,t + errori,t+1  
where Volume i,t  is the detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Return i,t is the return of an individual stock. 
We report the results of the OLS cross-sectional regressions: 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
where ORDBA and ORDCAP are variables representing the ordinal scales of BAsprd and AvgCap, respectively. In 
Panel B, we test the robustness of our results to a longer estimation period. We estimate the time series regressions 
for the stocks in our sample using 10 years of data (1989–1998). We present the results of the cross-sectional 
regressions using the same information asymmetry proxies as in Panel A. T-statistics appear in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Using an Alternative to the Daily Interval for Measuring Return and Volume 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a B R2(%) Observations 
-0.015534 
(-6.286) 
0.038606 
(9.023) 
3.531 2,226 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.016285 
(6.521) 
-0.025003 
(-5.782) 
1.481 2,226 
 
 
Panel B: Using Ten Years of Data (1989-1998) 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a B R2(%) Observations 
-0.014592 
(-8.118) 
0.057887 
(18.599) 
13.461 2,226 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.037995 
(20.609) 
-0.047240 
(-14.799) 
8.965 2,226 
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Table 8 
Eliminating the Bid-Ask Bounce Effect 
 
The influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns is measured by the parameter C2i from the following 
time-series regression: 
Return i,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Return i,t + C2i*Volumei,t*Return i,t + errori,t+1  
To eliminate the effects of bid-ask bounce, we calculate Return i, from end-of-day mid-quotes. We report the results 
of the cross-sectional regressions: 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
where ORDBA and ORDCAP are variables representing the ordinal scales of BAsprd and AvgCap, respectively. To 
eliminate the effects of outliers, the cross-sectional regressions are estimated using the two-stage least trimmed 
squares procedure described in Section 4.1. 
 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
-0.020033 
(-8.87) 
0.028729 
(7.45) 
2.674 2,225 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.006676 
(3.01) 
-0.025449 
(-6.52) 
2.050 2,225 
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Table 9 
Alternative Definitions of Volume  
 
In Panel A, the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns is measured by the parameter C2i from 
the following time-series regression: 
Return i,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Return t + C2i*Volumei,t*Return i,t + errori,t+1  
where turnover (the daily number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding) serves as the 
alternative definition of volume.   
In Panel B, the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns is measured by the parameter C2i from 
the following time-series regression: 
Return i,t+1 = C0i +C1i* Return t + C2i* (Volumei,t)
2 *Return i,t + errori,t+1  
where log(1+daily number of shares traded) serves as the alternative definition of volume.   
Using the results of the time-series regressions, both panels report the results of the cross-sectional regressions: 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
where ORDBA and ORDCAP are variables representing the ordinal scales of BAsprd and AvgCap, respectively. T-
statistics appear in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Volume Is Measured as Turnover 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
-3.322436 
(-3.869) 
10.685070 
(7.186) 
2.269 2,226 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
6.408573 
(7.434) 
-8.768206 
(-5.875) 
1.528 2,226 
 
 
Panel B: Volume Is Measured as log(1+Shares Traded) 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a B R2(%) Observations 
-0.001029 
(-11.917) 
0.003526 
(23.579) 
19.999 2,226 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.002335 
(26.454) 
-0.003199 
(-20.934) 
16.461 2,226 
 
 
 43 
Table 10 
Analyst Following as an Information Asymmetry Proxy  
 
The influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns is measured by the parameter C2i from the following 
time-series regression: 
Return i,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Return t + C2i*Volumei,t*Return i,t + errori,t+1  
To construct the proxy for analyst following, we look for the monthly number of analysts who provide I/B/E/S with 
an end-of-fiscal-year earnings forecast for the current year. NUMESTi is the average monthly number of analysts 
over the sample period (six years). We use this variable as a proxy for information asymmetry (the more analysts, 
the less information asymmetry). We use a reduced sample of 2035 firms for which we found information 
concerning analyst following in the I/B/E/S database. We report the results of the cross-sectional regressions:  
C2i = a + b*NUMESTi + ERRORi 
C2i = a + b*ORDESTi + ERRORi 
ORDESTi is a variable representing the ordinal scale of NUMESTi, where two firms that have the same number of 
analysts receive the same rank. T-statistics appear in parentheses. 
 
 
C2i = a + b*NUMESTi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.016435 
(9.789) 
-0.000760 
(-5.362) 
1.395 2,035 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDESTi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.022239 
(10.970) 
-0.026790 
(-7.383) 
2.611 2,035 
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Table 11 
Firm-Specific Information Asymmetry and return-volume relation 
 
This table contains an empirical test of the hypothesis that firm-specific information asymmetry is a driving force 
behind the dynamic relation between returns and volume.  For each stock, we measure the influence of volume on 
the autocorrelation of stock returns by the parameter C2i from the following regression:  
ResReturn i,t+1 = C0i  + C1i*ResReturn i,t + C2i*ResVolume i,t*ResReturn i,t + errori,t+1  
ResReturn i,t is the daily abnormal return of an individual stock. We define abnormal return as the residual of a 
market model in which the market return is constructed using a value-weighted portfolio comprised of all common 
stocks that traded on the NYSE or AMEX with valid return and volume information in the CRSP database for that 
day.  ResVolume i,t is the residual volume of an individual stock. It is defined in a fashion analogous to abnormal 
return as the residual of a market model in which market volume is the daily detrended log turnover of the value-
weighted portfolio. The table presents the results of the cross-sectional regressions: 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi  
where ORDBA and ORDCAP are variables representing the ordinal scales of BAsprd and AvgCap. 
T-statistics appear in parentheses. 
 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDBA i + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.000740 
(0.374) 
0.038645 
(11.277) 
5.409 2,226 
 
C2i = a + b*ORDCAPi + ERRORi 
a b R2(%) Observations 
0.033270 
(16.559) 
-0.026386 
(-7.585) 
2.522 2,226 
 
  
 
